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Es ist dabei selbst die historische Wahrheit eine Nebensache, ein erfundenes Beispiel ko¨nnte
auch dienen; nur haben historische immer den Vorzug, praktischer zu sein und den Gedanken,
welchen sie erla¨utern, dem praktischen Leben selbst na¨her zu fu¨hren.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
The paper discusses the strategy-proofness of sports tournaments with multiple group
stages. This design divides the competitors into round-robin groups in the preliminary
and main rounds such that the results of matches played in the preliminary round
against teams in the same main round group are carried over. It is shown that these
tournaments, widely used in handball and other sports, are incentive incompatible
because tanking can change the set of qualified teams. Historical examples are
presented where a team was ex ante disinterested in winning by a high margin. We
propose two incentive compatible mechanisms and compare them to the original
format via simulations. Carrying over half of all points scored in the preliminary
round turns out to be a promising policy.
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handball
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1 “Historical correctness is a secondary consideration; a case invented might also serve the purpose
as well, only historical ones are always to be preferred, because they bring the idea which they illustrate
nearer to practical life.” (Source: Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Book 2, Chapter 6 – On Examples,
translated by Colonel James John Graham, London, N. Tru¨bner, 1873. http://clausewitz.com/
readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm)
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1 Introduction
It is known at least since Arrow’s pioneering work that the real world is full of decision
paradoxes (Arrow, 1950). This is true even though Arrow’s impossibility theorem neglects
the fact that voters are strategic actors: according to the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), all fair voting rules are susceptible to
tactical voting in the case of more than two alternatives as there always exists a voter who
can achieve a better outcome by being insincere.
Furthermore, a widely used rule may remain manipulable despite the existence of
incentive compatible mechanisms. For example, Tasna´di (2008) demonstrated that the
Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, applied between 1990 and 2010, suffers from
the population paradox since the governing coalition may lose seats either by getting
more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes. Analogously, the invariant method
(Pinski and Narin, 1976) – axiomatically characterised by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004),
and used to quality-rank academic journals – is subject to manipulation as a journal can
boost its performance by making additional citations to other journals (Ko´czy and Strobel,
2009).
Strategy-proofness is an especially important issue in sports where all contestants are
familiar with the high-stake decisions involved, and they obviously behave as strategic actors.
Consequently, any tournament design should provide the players with the appropriate
incentives to perform (Szymanski, 2003).
Although sporting applications of operations research proliferate in the academic world
(Wright, 2009, 2014), the scientific analysis of sports ranking rules from the perspective of
incentive compatibility has started only recently. Kendall and Lenten (2017) give probably
the first comprehensive review of sports regulations with unexpected consequences. On the
basis of their examples, three possible situations can be identified in which a team might
prefer losing a game to winning it: (1) when it might gain advantages in the next season;
(2) when a lower ranked team can still qualify and it might face a favoured competitor in
a later stage of the tournament; (3) when a team is strictly better off by losing due to an
ill-constructed design.
The classical example for the first situation arises from the reverse order applied in
the traditional set-up of player drafts, which aims to increase competitive balance over
time. Consequently, if a team is still certainly eliminated from the play-off, a perverse
incentive is created to tank in the later games (Taylor and Trogdon, 2002; Fornwagner,
2018; Lenten et al., 2018).
The second situation occurred, for instance, in Badminton at the 2012 Summer Olympics
– Women’s doubles (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.3.1), and has inspired some works
that address the strategic manipulation problem with the tools of game theory (Pauly,
2014; Vong, 2017).
However, in the first case, the rules are deliberately designed to support underdogs,
and in the second case, the team gains only in expected terms. Therefore, here the most
serious third situation will be discussed, when the tournament rules allow that a team
certainly benefits from a weaker performance.
Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon is the football match Barbados
vs Grenada (1994 Caribbean Cup qualification): a sudden-death goal scored in extra time
counted as double, which made it optimal to concede a goal at the end of the match in
order to gain additional time for the necessary two-goal win (Kendall and Lenten, 2017,
Section 3.9.4). The Barbadians exploited the opportunity by scoring an own goal in the
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87th minute (Dagaev and Sonin, 2018, Note 1). Nonetheless, this match had not affected
negatively any third team, hence one can agree with the decision of the FIFA (International
Federation of Association Football) not to penalise Barbados because the players were
striving for the best outcome conditional upon the prevailing rules. Unsurprisingly, the
strange regulation has not been applied since then.
A similar situation was prevented by a particular FIBA (International Basketball
Federation) rule saying that “if a player deliberately scores in the team’s own basket, it is a
violation and the basket does not count”: in the men’s tournament of the 2014 Asian Games
Basketball Competition, a Philippine player shot at his own basket against Kazakhstan in
order to force overtime and thus increase the margin of victory (Carpio, 2014).
Probably the first academic paper studying the problem of misaligned incentives is
Dagaev and Sonin (2018), where the authors prove that tournament systems, consisting
of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments with noncumulative prizes, are often
incentive incompatible. Recent qualifications for the UEFA (Union of European Foot-
ball Associations) European Championships have also been shown to be vulnerable to
manipulation (Csato´, 2018).
The current paper will reveal that sports tournaments with multiple group stages, in
which some (but not all) match results from the preliminary round are carried over to the
main round, suffer from incentive incompatibility. First, a handball match is presented
where a team had an incentive not to win by a high margin. Second, it is verified that this
particular tournament design always violates strategy-proofness. Finally, we provide an
incentive compatible mechanism, namely, to carry over a monotonic transformation of all
preliminary round results to the main round, regardless that some matches were played
against teams already eliminated from the tournament. It is shown via simulations that
carrying over half of all points scored in the preliminary round essentially does not affect
the selective ability and the competitive balance of the tournament, while it guarantees
strategy-proofness and even reduces the influence of seeding the teams into pots before
the draw of the groups. Since the Monte-Carlo simulations are implemented using the
framework of Csato´ (2019b), it is worth emphasising that Csato´ (2019b) aims to compare
certain tournament designs without addressing the issue of incentive compatibility at all.
Our main contributions can be summarised in the following way: (1) the incentive
incompatibility of sports tournaments with multiple group stages is verified by a mathemat-
ical model; (2) real world examples are presented to show that this is not only an irrelevant
issue in practice, and a third, innocent team might suffer from the unsportsmanlike act of
a team in a match; (3) a viable strategy-proof alternative is suggested. These results can
be especially useful for sports administrators who design tournaments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brings an example from handball,
which may be even more serious than the football match Barbados vs Grenada as an
unfair behaviour of a team could led to the elimination of a third team. Section 3 builds
a theoretical model to prove that a standard tournament with multiple group stages
violates strategy-proofness. Section 4 lists some recent sports tournaments applying this
design. In Section 5, we provide two incentive compatible mechanisms for organising
these tournaments and explore their characteristics with respect to selective ability and
competitive balance via simulations. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2 A real world example of misaligned incentives
The European Men’s Handball Championship is a biennial competition for the senior men’s
national handball teams of Europe since 1994, organised by the EHF (European Handball
Federation), the umbrella organization for European handball.2 The 11th European Men’s
Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014) was held in Denmark between 12 and 26 January
2014. In its preliminary round, the sixteen national teams were divided into four groups
(A-D) to play in a round-robin format. The top three teams in each group qualified to the
main round: teams from Groups A and B composed the first main round group X, while
teams from Groups C and D composed the second main round group Y. The main round
groups were also organised in a round-robin format, but all matches (consequently, results
and points) played in the preliminary round between teams that were in the same main
round group, were kept and remained valid for the ranking of the main round. Figure A.1
in the Appendix gives an overview of this tournament design.
In the groups of the preliminary and main rounds, two points were awarded for a win,
one point for a draw and zero points for a defeat. Teams were ranked by adding up their
number of points. If two or more teams had an equal number of points, the following
tie-breaking criteria were used after the completion of all group matches (EHF, 2014a,
Articles 9.12 and 9.24):
a) Higher number of points obtained in the group matches played amongst the teams
in question;
b) Superior goal difference from the group matches played amongst the teams in
question;
c) Higher number of goals scored in the group matches played amongst the teams in
question;
d) Superior goal difference from all group matches (achieved by subtraction);
e) Higher number of goals scored in all group matches.
A strange situation emerged in Group C of the preliminary round, which requires
further investigation. On 16 January 2014, each team in the group had one more game to
play. Table 1 shows the known results and the preliminary standing.
Consider the possible scenarios from the perspective of Poland. It is certainly eliminated
if it does not win against Russia. Poland carries over 0 points, 46 goals for and 48 goals
against to the main round if it wins against Russia and Serbia plays at least a draw against
France because then Russia will be eliminated as the fourth team of the group. On the
other hand, if Poland wins by 𝑥 goals against Russia and Serbia loses, there will be three
teams with 2 points, which obtained 2 points in the group matches played among them.
Consequently, the further tie-breaking criteria should be applied: Poland, Russia, and
Serbia will have head-to-head goal differences of 𝑥− 1, 2− 𝑥 and −1, respectively.
𝑥− 1 > −1 implies that Poland will qualify. Serbia is eliminated as being the fourth
team if 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 2. Russia and Serbia have the same head-to-head goal difference if 𝑥 = 3,
hence higher number of goals scored against the three teams with 2 points breaks the tie.
It is 45 for Serbia and at least 27 for Russia, thus Russia qualifies if it scores at least 19
2 This section is mainly based on the official homepage of the 11th Men’s European Handball
Championship (EHF Euro 2014). We will cite only those documents which concern the ranking of teams.
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Table 1: 11th European Men’s Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014) – Group C
(a) Match results
Date First team Second team Result
13 January 2014, 18:00 Serbia Poland 20-19
13 January 2014, 20:15 France Russia 35-28
15 January 2014, 18:00 Russia Serbia 27-25
15 January 2014, 20:15 Poland France 27-28
17 January 2014, 18:00 Poland Russia to be played
17 January 2014, 20:15 Serbia France to be played
(b) Standing after two matchdays
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 2 0 0 63 55 8 4
2 Serbia 1 0 1 45 46 -1 2
3 Russia 1 0 1 55 60 -5 2
4 Poland 0 0 2 46 48 -2 0
Notes: Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Lost; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD
= Goal difference; Pts = Points.
All teams have played 2 matches.
The top three teams qualify for the main round.
goals against Poland (if Poland vs Russia is 21-18, then the third place will depend on the
result of Serbia vs France). If 𝑥 ≥ 4, then Serbia has a better head-to-head goal difference
than Russia, thus Serbia qualifies, and Russia is eliminated.
To summarise, if Poland wins, it carries over its result against Russia (2 points) or
Serbia (0 points) to the main round, therefore Poland has every incentive to qualify
together with Russia. Consequently, it is ex ante unfavourable for Poland to win by more
than three goals against Russia because this scenario yields no gain in the main round but
may lead to a loss of 2 points if Serbia is defeated by France. However, Russia does not
have similar problems with its incentives, for example, it is clearly better off by a smaller
defeat compared to a greater one.
In fact, Poland vs Russia was 24-22 and Serbia vs France was 28-31, hence France,
Poland, and Russia qualified to the main round with 4, 2, and 0 points, respectively. The
result of Poland vs Russia was 10-14 after 30 minutes (half-time), while the match stood
at 21-16 in the 48th, 22-17 in the 50th, and 23-18 in the 52nd minute (EHF, 2014b).3
These events, perhaps influenced by the misaligned incentives of Poland, led to the
elimination of a third, innocent team, Serbia, which makes the example especially wor-
rying. The situation could not have been improved by playing the last group matches
simultaneously because Poland’s (weakly) dominant strategy was independent of the result
of the game played later. This seems to be a persuading argument against the rules of
11th European Men’s Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014).
3 A video of the match Poland vs Russia is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
dQvEAzyBgGo.
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3 The model
Now we build a model of a tournament consisting of round-robin preliminary and main
rounds, where the matches played in the preliminary round against teams that qualified
to the same main round group are carried over. This design will be proved to violate
strategy-proofness, that is, it allows for misaligned incentives. Our notations follow Csato´
(2019a) in certain details since the qualification system discussed there is also based on
round-robin groups.
Definition 3.1. Round-robin group: The pair (𝑋,𝑅) is a round-robin group where
∙ 𝑋 is a finite set of at least two teams;
∙ the ranking method 𝑅 associates a strict order 𝑅(𝑣) on the set 𝑋 for any function
𝑣 : 𝑋 ×𝑋 → {(𝑣1; 𝑣2) : 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ N} ∪ {—} ∪ {⊗} such that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = — if 𝑥 = 𝑦
and 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = ⊗ implies 𝑣(𝑦, 𝑥) = ⊗.
Function 𝑣 describes game results with the number of goals scored by the first and
second team, respectively. It contains the possibility that some matches between the teams
remain to be played, denoted by the symbol ⊗.
Definition 3.1 can describe a home-and-away round-robin tournament where any two
teams play each other once at home and once at away. Then the first team is the one
playing at home.
Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a round-robin group, 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦 be two teams, and 𝑣 be a set of
results. 𝑥 is ranked higher (lower) than 𝑦 if and only if 𝑥 is preferred to 𝑦 by 𝑅(𝑣), that
is, 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦 (𝑥 ≺𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦). Consider 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦); 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)). It is said that team 𝑥
wins over team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away), team 𝑥 loses
to team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) > 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away) and team 𝑥 draws
against team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥).
In some professional team sports (basketball, ice hockey, volleyball, etc.) draws are
prohibited. Since we want to keep the model as general as possible, it is assumed that
no matches result in a draw. Introducing this constraint will cause no problem, because
achieving our purpose of finding a situation which is vulnerable to manipulation becomes
more difficult on a smaller domain.
Assumption 1. Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a round-robin group. No matches result in a draw: 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸=
⊗ implies 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸= 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) for any two teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦.
The ranking is usually based on the number of points scored.
Definition 3.2. Number of points: Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a round-robin group, 𝑣 be a set of
results, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team, and 𝛼 > 𝛽 be two parameters. Denote by 𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) the number of
wins and by 𝑁 ℓ𝑣(𝑥) the number of losses of team 𝑥, respectively. The number of points of
team 𝑥 is 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) + 𝛽𝑁 ℓ𝑣(𝑥).
In other words, a win means 𝛼 points and a loss gives 𝛽 points.
Remark 3.1. With a slight abuse of notation, it is assumed in the following that the ranking
method 𝑅 determines the values 𝛼 > 𝛽 for any round-robin group (𝑋,𝑅).
The number of points does not necessarily induce a strict order on the set of teams,
hence some tie-breaking rules should be introduced.
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Definition 3.3. Goal difference: Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a round-robin group, 𝑣 be a set of results,
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. The goal difference of team 𝑥 is
𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋∖{𝑥}, 𝑣(𝑥,𝑦) ̸=⊗
[𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)] +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋∖{𝑥}, 𝑣(𝑥,𝑦)̸=⊗
[𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)] .
Goal difference is the number of goals scored by team 𝑥 minus the number of goals
conceded by team 𝑥.
Definition 3.4. Head-to-head results: Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a round-robin group, 𝑣 be a set of
results, and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. Denote by 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑋 ∖ {𝑥} a set of teams.
The head-to-head number of points of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 is
𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝛼 (| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |) +
+𝛽 (| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) > 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |) .
The head-to-head goal difference of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 in (𝑋, 𝑣) is
𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
[𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)] +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
[𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)] .
In accordance with EHF (2014a, Articles 9.12 and 9.24), head-to-head results are
calculated only in complete round-robin groups where all matches have already been
played.
Definition 3.5. Head-to-head domination: Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a round-robin group, 𝑣 be a
set of results, and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 be two teams such that 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦). Denote by 𝐿 the
set of teams which have scored the same number of points as teams 𝑥 and 𝑦. Team 𝑥
head-to-head dominates team 𝑦 if one of the following holds:
∙ 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑦);
∙ 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑦) and 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑦).
Therefore, if two teams have the same number of points, then one head-to-head
dominates the other if: (a) it has scored more points against all teams with the same
number of points (the first condition); or (b) it has scored the same number of points
against all teams with the same number of points but has a superior goal difference against
them (the second condition). See the analogy to EHF (2014a, Articles 9.12 and 9.24).
Definition 3.6. Monotonicity of the ranking in a round-robin group: Let (𝑋,𝑅) be a
round-robin group. Its ranking method is called monotonic if for any set of results 𝑣 and
for any teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋:
1. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑠𝑣(𝑦) implies 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦;
2. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦), 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑦), and 𝑥 head-to-head dominates 𝑦 imply 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦.
Monotonicity requires that (a) a team should be ranked higher if it has a greater
number of points (criterion 1); and (b) a team should be ranked higher compared to any
other with the same number of points, an inferior goal difference, and worse head-to-head
results against all teams with the same number of points (criterion 2).
Monotonicity still does not necessarily result in a strict ranking. The complexity of
Definition 3.6 is due to cover the two different tie-breaking concepts, goal difference and
head-to-head results. For example, in association football, the FIFA currently uses the
former, while the UEFA applies the latter rule.
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Definition 3.7. Preliminary round: The preliminary round 𝒫 consists of 𝑘 groups of
round-robin tournaments (𝑋1, 𝑅1), (𝑋2, 𝑅2), . . . , (𝑋𝑘, 𝑅𝑘) such that 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋ℎ = ∅ for any
ℎ ̸= 𝑖, 1 ≤ ℎ, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘.
Definition 3.8. Main round: The main round ℳ consists of ℓ groups of round-robin
tournaments (𝑌 1, 𝑆1), (𝑌 2, 𝑆2), . . . , (𝑌 ℓ, 𝑆ℓ) such that 𝑌 𝑗 ∩ 𝑌 ℎ = ∅ for any 𝑗 ̸= ℎ,
1 ≤ ℎ, 𝑗 ≤ ℓ.
Definition 3.9. Qualification rule: Let 𝒫 be a preliminary round and ℳ be a main
round. For any set of results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
in the preliminary round such that
𝑣𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸= ⊗ for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, a qualification rule 𝒬 associates the sets
𝑌 1, 𝑌 2, . . . 𝑌 ℓ and the set of results 𝑊 =
{︁
𝑤1, 𝑤2, . . . , 𝑤ℓ
}︁
in the main round groups.
Thus the qualification rule determines the composition of the groups in the main round
and the set of results carried over from the preliminary round on the basis of all results in
the preliminary round, that is, after all matches have been played there.
Team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 is said to be qualified to the main round if 𝑥 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗.
Definition 3.10. Tournament with multiple group stages: A tournament with multiple
group stages is a triple (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) consisting of the preliminary round 𝒫 , the main round
ℳ, and the qualification rule 𝒬.
It is natural to restrict our attention to a reasonable subset of tournaments.
Definition 3.11. Regularity of a tournament with multiple groups stages: Let (𝒫 ,ℳ,𝒬)
be a tournament with multiple group stages. It is called regular if under any set of results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
in the preliminary round such that 𝑣𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸= ⊗ for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, the following conditions hold:
a) ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗 ⊆ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖;
b) there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖 in each group (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑅𝑖) of the
preliminary round 𝒫 such that 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 and 𝑦 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗 imply 𝑥 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗 for
all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘;
c) 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝑌 𝑗 implies 𝑤𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦), where 𝑤𝑗 is the set of results in the
main round group (𝑌 𝑗, 𝑆𝑗);
d) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋ℎ, 𝑖 ̸= ℎ, and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 imply 𝑤𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦) = ⊗, where 𝑤𝑗 is the set of
results in the main round group (𝑌 𝑗, 𝑆𝑗);
e) there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑗 in each group (𝑌 𝑗, 𝑆𝑗) of the
main round ℳ.
The idea behind a regular tournament with multiple group stages is straightforward.
Some top teams from the preliminary round groups qualify for the main round (conditions a)
and b)), where they are divided into new groups such that the matches already played
against teams in the same main round group are carried over (conditions c) ad d)).
Furthermore, the rankings in the preliminary and main round groups are monotonic and
coincide (conditions b) and e)).
Perhaps these principles have inspired the decision-makers of the EHF.
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Definition 3.12. Manipulation: Let (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) be a tournament with multiple group
stages. A team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 can manipulate the tournament if there exist two sets of results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
and 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
in the preliminary round
such that 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) ≥ 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, furthermore, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗,
1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ according to both 𝒬(𝑉 ) and 𝒬(𝑉 ), and either 𝑠?¯? (𝑥) > 𝑠𝑊 (𝑥), or 𝑠?¯? (𝑥) = 𝑠𝑊 (𝑥)
and 𝑔𝑑?¯? (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑊 (𝑥).
Manipulation means that team 𝑥 can increase its number of points (𝑠?¯? (𝑥) > 𝑠𝑊 (𝑥)),
or at least improve its goal difference (𝑔𝑑?¯? (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑊 (𝑥)) with preserving its number of
points (𝑠?¯? (𝑥) = 𝑠𝑊 (𝑥)) in the main round by conceding more goals in a match of the
preliminary round.
Since conceding more goals is in the hands of a team, it can be regarded as its decision
variable.
Definition 3.13. Strategy-proofness: A tournament with multiple group stages (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬)
is called strategy-proof if there exists no set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
under
which a team 𝑥 ∈ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 can manipulate.
Our central result concerns the strategy-proofness of regular tournaments with multiple
group stages: while manipulation certainly worsens a team’s goal difference (and sometimes
its number of points, too) in its preliminary round group as the ranking rule applied here
is monotonic, this might pay off in the main round, where some matches of the preliminary
round are discarded – provided that the team still qualifies.
Proposition 3.1. Let (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) be a regular tournament with multiple group stages such
that the following conditions hold:
∙ there exists 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝑌 𝑗 for some 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ;
∙ there exists 𝑢 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 but 𝑢 /∈ 𝑌 𝑗.
Then this tournament with multiple group stages does not satisfy strategy-proofness.
According to the conditions of Proposition 3.1, the result of at least one match played
in the preliminary round (between the teams 𝑥 and 𝑦) is carried over to main round, and
the results of some matches (between the teams 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑢) are ignored in the main round.
Proof. An example is presented where a team can manipulate a tournament with multiple
group stages that satisfies all criteria of Proposition 3.1.
Example 3.1. Consider a regular tournament with multiple group stages (𝒫 ,ℳ,𝒬). Let
(𝑋1, 𝑅) be a single round-robin group in the preliminary round with 𝑋1 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} such
that any two teams play only one match similarly to Section 2, therefore the number of
points is between 2𝛽 and 2𝛼.
Assume that there is ℓ = 1 group in the main round and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋1 ∩ 𝑌 1 if and only if{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋1 : 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣1) 𝑧
}︁
̸= ∅, namely, the group winner and the runner-up qualify for the
main round from the group (𝑋1, 𝑅).
A possible set of results in this group is shown in Table 2. Team 𝑎 is the group-winner
since it has the best (head-to-head) goal difference (see criterion 2 of a monotonic group
ranking method). Furthermore, it is considered with 𝑠𝑊 (𝑎) = 𝛽 points in the main
round, after discarding its match played against team 𝑐, the last team in the group due to
criterion 2 of a monotonic group ranking 𝑅 (see the last but one row of Table 2).
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Table 2: The round-robin group (𝑋1, 𝑅) of Example 3.1
Position Team 𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 GF GA GD Pts
1 𝑎 — 0-1 4-0 4 1 3 𝛼 + 𝛽
2 𝑏 1-0 — 0-2 1 2 -1 𝛼 + 𝛽
3 𝑐 0-4 2-0 — 2 4 -2 𝛼 + 𝛽
1 𝑎 — 0-1 — 0 1 -1 𝛽
1* 𝑎* — — 2-0* 2* 0* 2* 𝛼*
Notes: GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal difference; Pts = Points.
The last but one row contains the group winner’s benchmark results that are carried over to the main
round.
The last row contains the group winner’s alternative results that are carried over to the main round
after it manipulates.
However, examine what happens if 𝑣1(𝑎, 𝑐) = (2; 0), thus 𝑣1(𝑐, 𝑎) = (0; 2). Then teams
𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 remain with 𝛼 + 𝛽 points, but they have the head-to-head goal differences +1,
−1, and 0, respectively. Therefore 𝑎 is the first and 𝑐 is the second according to criterion 2
of a monotonic group ranking 𝑅, and team 𝑎 is considered with 𝑠?¯? (𝑎) = 𝛼 > 𝛽 = 𝑠𝑊 (𝑎)
points in the main round (see the last row of Table 2).
To conclude, team 𝑎 has an opportunity to manipulate this regular tournament with
multiple group stages under the set of group results 𝑉 , hence it violates strategy-proofness.
Example 3.1 contains only three teams, which is minimal under the conditions of
Proposition 3.1. The number of groups and the number of teams in them can be increased
without changing the essence of the counterexample. Groups can be double round-robin
tournaments instead of single ones, too.
Proposition 3.1 remains valid if draws are allowed in a tournament with multiple group
stages.
Remark 3.2. The 11th European Men’s Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014), dis-
cussed in Section 2, fits into the model presented above. The number of groups in the
preliminary round is 𝑘 = 4, the number of groups in the main round is ℓ = 2, and it is a
regular tournament with multiple group stages (EHF, 2014a):
a) 𝑌 1 ⊂ 𝑋1 ∪𝑋2 and 𝑌 2 ⊂ 𝑋3 ∪𝑋4;
b) Ranking in the preliminary round groups is monotonic as it is based on the
number of points with tie-breaking through head-to-head results, and the top
three teams qualify for the main round;
c) Matches played in the preliminary round against opponents which qualified to
the main round are kept and remain valid for the ranking of the main round;
d) In the main round, each team faces three teams which did not participate in its
preliminary round group;
e) Ranking in the main round groups is monotonic as it is based on the number of
points with tie-breaking through head-to-head results.
Example 3.2. The 11th European Men’s Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014) is
not strategy-proof.
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Proof. The scenario presented in Section 2 shows that team Poland = 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋3 can
manipulate against Russia = 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋3: there exist sets of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4}
and 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4} such that 𝑣3 = 𝑣3 except for 𝑣31(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣32(𝑦, 𝑥) = 26 > 24 =
𝑣31(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣32(𝑦, 𝑥), furthermore, Poland qualifies to the group (𝑋2, 𝑆) according to both
𝒬(𝑉 ) and 𝒬(𝑉 ), and, finally, 𝑠?¯? (𝑥) = 2 > 0 = 𝑠𝑊 (𝑥).
Proposition 3.1 can also be applied due to Remark 3.2.
Now we state a positive result, a “pair” of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.2. Let (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) be a regular tournament with multiple group stages such
that at least one of the following conditions hold:
∙ there does not exist 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝑌 𝑗 for any 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ;
∙ 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and 𝑢 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 imply 𝑣 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘.
Then this tournament with multiple group stages is strategy-proof.
Proof. If all preliminary round results obtained against other qualified teams are ignored
(first condition), or carried over to the main round (second condition), then it makes
no sense to perform weaker in the preliminary round due to the monotonicity of group
rankings in both rounds.
Proposition 3.2 implies that teams qualifying from the same preliminary round group
should be drawn into different groups in the main round (which is guaranteed if only one
team qualifies from each preliminary round group), or all teams from a given preliminary
round group should qualify for the same main round group in order to avoid incentive
incompatibility.
It is also clear from the match discussed in Section 2 that head-to-head results cannot
be used to break a tie in the main round between two teams qualified from the same
preliminary round group, otherwise there remain some incentives to influence the set of
qualified teams.
Our main result is somewhat related to – but entirely independent of – the finding of
Vong (2017) that in general multi-stage tournaments, the necessary and sufficient condition
of strategy-proofness is to allow only the top-ranked player to qualify from each group.
However, in the model of Vong (2017), teams tank in order to meet preferred opponents in
the next round, thus they only gain in expected value. Contrarily, Definition 3.13 requires
that a team cannot be strictly better off by a lower effort.
4 Tournaments with multiple group stages
The European Men’s Handball Championship between 1994 and 2000 consisted of a group
stage followed by a knockout stage, hence these tournaments were incentive compatible.
Between 2002 and 2018, it used the format presented in Section 2 and in Figure A.1 in
the Appendix: a preliminary round with four groups of four teams each such that the first
three teams qualify for the main round with two groups of six teams each, and they carry
over the matches played against the two teams in their preliminary round group. The
winners and runners-up of the main round groups qualify for the semifinals.
The 2020 European Men’s Handball Championship is the first competition involving
24 teams. The contestants are drawn into six groups of four teams, and the top two teams
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in each group proceed to the main round. This stage consists of two groups, each created
from three preliminary round groups. Therefore, all teams play four matches in the main
round. The top two teams of a main round group advance to the semifinals. The format
remains incentive incompatible because some results are carried over.
During the 10th European Men’s Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2012), a situation
analogous to the one presented in Section 2 emerged. Slovenia played its last match in
Group D against Iceland when Croatia had 4 points after it won against Iceland and
Slovenia, Norway had 2 points because of its win against Slovenia by 28-27, and Iceland
had also 2 points due to its win against Norway by 34-32. Consequently, Slovenia should
have won against Iceland to qualify for the main round, but it would be better not to
win by more than 3 goals in order to carry over its match played against Iceland. The
actual results were Iceland vs Slovenia 32-34, and Croatia vs Norway 26-22 (with Iceland
vs Slovenia 31-34 or 32-35, Iceland still would have qualified, but 30-34, 31-35, or 32-36
would be unfavourable for Slovenia).
The Women’s European Handball Championship is the official competition for senior
women’s national handball teams of Europe. It takes place in the same years as Men’s
European Handball Championship and was organised in the same format until 2018.
Therefore, it was also strategy-proof until 2000, but it is incentive incompatible from 2002.
The Women’s EHF Champions League is an annual competition for women’s handball
clubs in Europe since the season of 1993/94. It is the most prestigious tournament for the
best clubs of the continent’s leading national leagues. The tournament is organised with
multiple group stages since 2013/14. Its preliminary round consists of four groups of four
teams each, playing each other twice in home and away matches with the top three teams
qualifying. In the main round, two groups of six teams are formed, and teams play twice,
in home and away matches against the three teams from the other preliminary round
group. The top four teams from each group advance to the quarterfinals.
The World Men’s Handball Championship, organised by the IHF (International Hand-
ball Federation), takes place in every second year since 1993. Between 1995 and 2019, 24
teams competed in four different tournament formats (Csato´, 2019b). Among them, three
designs violate incentive compatibility due to Proposition 3.1.
Since 1993, the World Women’s Handball Championship is played in the same years and
designed in the same format as the corresponding men’s tournament, with the exception
of the years 1995, 2003, and 2011.
Table 3 summarises the incentive incompatible handball tournaments discussed above.
They all contain two group stages, and the number of qualified teams in the main round
shows the number of teams which have a chance to win the tournament at the end of this
stage (see the last column).
Tournaments with multiple group stages are also used in other sports, for instance,
in basketball (EuroBasket 2013), cricket (2007 Cricket World Cup) (Scarf et al., 2009),
and volleyball (2014 FIVB Volleyball Men’s World Championship). A match played by
Australia and West Indies in the 1999 Cricket World Cup might also be an example of tacit
collusion, or emerging cooperation (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.7.2). However, in
contrast to the scenario presented in Section 2, this plan – if there was one – did not work
out entirely.
The 1999-2000 UEFA Champions League, as well as the following three seasons of this
tournament, included multiple group stages, too: from the first phase of eight groups with
four teams each, the winners and the runners-up were divided into four groups composed
of two group winners and two runners-up each such that teams from the same country or
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Table 3: Recent handball tournaments with multiple group stages
Preliminary round Main round
Tournament Year(s) Type Gr.(𝑘) Teams Q Gr.(ℓ) Teams Q
EHF Euro Men 2002-2018 S 4 4 3 2 6 2
EHF Euro Men 2020– S 6 4 2 2 6 2
EHF Euro Women 2002– S 4 4 3 2 6 2
EHF Women’s CL 2013/14– D 4 4 3 2 6 4
IHF World Men 2003 S 4 6 4 4 4 1
IHF World Men 2005, 2009-2011, 2019 S 4 6 3 2 6 2
IHF World Men 2007 S 6 4 2 2 6 4
IHF World Women 2003-2005, 2009, 2019 S 4 6 3 2 6 2
IHF World Women 2007 S 6 4 2 2 6 4
Notes: S = single round-robin (in groups); D = double round-robin (in groups); Gr. = Number of groups in the
preliminary and main round, respectively, which are denoted by 𝑘 and ℓ in the theoretical model of Section 3;
Teams = Number of teams in each group of the preliminary and main round, respectively; Q = Number of
teams qualified from each group of the preliminary and main round, respectively.
Abbreviations: EHF Euro Men (Women) = European Men’s (Women’s) Handball Championship; EHF Women’s
CL = Women’s EHF Champions League; IHF World Men (Women) = IHF World Men’s (Women’s) Handball
Championship.
from the same first round group could not be drawn together. Consequently, no results
were carried over to the second group stage, guaranteeing the incentive compatibility of
the design by Proposition 3.2.
5 Two ways of overcoming incentive incompatibility
Our theoretical results in Section 3 reveal that there is no straightforward way to guarantee
the strategy-proofness of tournaments with multiple group stages, in contrast to tournament
systems consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments (Dagaev and Sonin,
2018), or group-based qualification systems (Csato´, 2019a).
According to Proposition 3.2, incentive compatibility will be satisfied if either all points
scored in the preliminary round are considered in the main round (directly or after an
arbitrary monotonic transformation), or all of them are discarded, which is against the
essence of these tournaments. Consequently, the only reasonable solution is to carry over
all preliminary round results to the main round, perhaps after a monotonic transformation,
regardless that some matches were played against teams already eliminated from the
tournament.
However, if all results are carried through, then the subsequent phase loses a bit of
excitement because there will be greater variation in points at the commencement of this
stage, and the teams entering bottom will find it much harder to catch up with the teams
entering the stage on top.
This effect can be mitigated by carrying over only half of the points from the preliminary
round. The idea comes from the Belgian First Division A, the top league competition
for association football clubs in Belgium, where the sixteen participants play a double
round-robin tournament in the regular season, followed by a championship play-off for
the first six teams such that the points obtained during the regular season are halved. A
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similar policy is applied currently in the top-tier association football leagues in Poland,
Romania, and Serbia (Lasek and Gagolewski, 2018).
For tie-breaking purposes, we suggest retaining the number of goals scored and conceded
in the preliminary round. Theoretically, they can also be discarded, but it seems to be
unfair when there was a match played in the preliminary round against a team from the
same main round group. In the case of Belgian First Division A, goal difference is not
among the tie-breaking criteria in the championship play-offs.
Therefore, we will consider two incentive compatible versions of each tournament
designed with multiple group stages: (1) carrying over all results from the preliminary round;
and (2) carrying over half of the points from the preliminary round. The consequences of
these modifications will be explored here as a kind of cost-benefit analysis via simulations,
implemented in the framework of Csato´ (2019b), a recent paper that attempts to compare
four tournament formats of the World Men’s Handball Championships with respect to
several criteria.
As Table 3 shows, this tournament has applied three formats containing multiple group
stages. Since the one used in 2003 suffers from various problems and seems not to be
efficacious (Csato´, 2019b), the following two are investigated:
∙ Format 𝐺66: This design, presented in Figure A.2, has been used first in the 2005
World Men’s Handball Championship and has been applied in the 2009, 2011,
and 2019 tournaments, too.
The preliminary round (see Figure A.2a) consists of four groups of six teams
each such that the top three teams qualify for the main round. The main round
consists of two groups of six teams, each created from two preliminary round
groups. The top two teams of every main round group advance to the semifinals
in the knockout stage (see Figure A.2b).
∙ Format 𝐺46: This design, presented in Figure A.3, has been used in the 2007
World Men’s Handball Championship.
The teams are drawn into six groups of four teams each in the preliminary round
(see Figure A.3a) such that the top two teams proceed to the main round. The
main round consists of two groups of six teams, each created from three preliminary
round groups. The top four teams of every main round group advance to the
quarterfinals in the knockout stage (see Figure A.3b).4
While the knockout stage of both tournament formats is immediately determined by
the preceding group stages, the competing teams should be drawn into groups before the
start of the tournament, thus the seeding regime may also affect the outcome (Guyon,
2015, 2018; Dagaev and Rudyak, 2019; Cea et al., 2019; Laliena and Lo´pez, 2019). On the
other hand, seeding is clearly independent of how the results are carried over from the
preliminary round to the main round.
Hence, similarly to Csato´ (2019b), two variants of each tournament design, called
seeded and unseeded, are considered. In the seeded version, the preliminary round groups
are drawn such that in the case of groups with 𝑘 teams (𝑘 = 4 for 𝐺46 and 𝑘 = 6 for 𝐺66),
the strongest 𝑘 teams are placed in Pot 1, the next strongest 𝑘 teams in Pot 2, and so on.
Then each group gets one team from each pot. The unseeded version divides the teams
4 The format of the 2020 European Men’s Handball Championship is almost the same as 𝐺46, the
sole difference is that only the two top teams from the two main round groups qualify for the semifinals in
the latter tournament.
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into the pots randomly. Therefore, a strong team, allocated in a harsh group, will have
more difficulties in qualifying than a “lucky” weak team, allocated in an easier group.
Table 4: Tournament designs considered in the simulations
Notation Format Seeding policy Description
𝐺66/S 𝐺66 seeded original incentive incompatible
𝐺66/R 𝐺66 unseeded original incentive incompatible
𝐺66◇/S 𝐺66 seeded all points are carried over
𝐺66◇/R 𝐺66 unseeded all points are carried over
𝐺66⋆/S 𝐺66 seeded half of all points are carried over
𝐺66⋆/R 𝐺66 unseeded half of all points are carried over
𝐺46/S 𝐺46 seeded original incentive incompatible
𝐺46/R 𝐺46 unseeded original incentive incompatible
𝐺46◇/S 𝐺46 seeded all points are carried over
𝐺46◇/R 𝐺46 unseeded all points are carried over
𝐺46⋆/S 𝐺46 seeded half of all points are carried over
𝐺46⋆/R 𝐺46 unseeded half of all points are carried over
Table 4 summarises the twelve tournament designs to be analysed.
The results of the matches are determined by the a priori fixed winning probabilities,
which depend on the pre-tournament ranks of the teams 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 24, such that a stronger
team defeats a weaker team with a higher probability than vice versa.
Further details of the simulation procedure can be found in Csato´ (2019b). According
to the arguments presented there, all simulations have been implemented with one million
runs.
Our tournament metrics are as follows:
∙ the average pre-tournament rank of the winner, the second-, the third- and the
fourth-placed teams;
∙ the expected quality of the final (the sum of the finalists’ pre-tournament ranks);
∙ the expected competitive balance of the final (the difference between the finalists’
pre-tournament ranks).
Figure 1 shows the average pre-tournament rank of the first four teams. If all points
are carried over from the preliminary round, then the result of the tournament becomes
more predetermined as the expected rank slightly decreases. Preserving only half of these
points substantially mitigates this loss of excitement, except in the unseeded variant of
format 𝐺46. On the other hand, the average rank of the winner is even higher in the case
of seeded 𝐺46 according to this solution than under the original incentive incompatible
design.
In addition, carrying over half of all points minimises the effect of the seeding policy,
which seems to be desirable because it is a factor not influenced by the competitors.
Figure 2 reinforces these findings by focusing on the final of the tournament: if the half
of all points scored in the preliminary round are carried over instead of only the results
against the teams qualified for the main round, then the final may become a bit more
boring but usually involves stronger teams. It decreases the influence of the seeding regime
again, especially in the format 𝐺66.
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Figure 1: Expected pre-tournament rank of the first four teams
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(b) Tournament format 𝐺46
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Following Scarf et al. (2009), we have made a robustness check by calculating the
metrics for more and less competitive tournaments than the baseline version, in the same
way as Csato´ (2019b). All qualitative results are independent of the distribution of teams’
strength.
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Figure 2: Characteristics of the tournament final
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(b) Tournament format 𝐺46
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The comparison of Figures 1.a and 1.b, as well as Figures 2.a and 2.b, reveals that
the choice of the tournament format is more important than the effect of how points are
carried over to the main round (see the scales on the vertical axis). Since there is no
consensus in the former, at least for the Men’s (Women’s) World Handball Championships,
it makes not much sense to dispute the use of the suggested incentive compatible variants
of tournaments with multiple group stages on the basis of certain tournament metrics.
To conclude, the price of guaranteeing incentive compatibility seems to be negligible –
at least, compared to other features of the design like the particular tournament format or
the seeding policy. We propose to carry over half of the points scored in the preliminary
round. Applying this solution has another, unexpected advantage by minimising the effects
of the preliminary seeding of the teams into pots.
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6 Conclusions
The optimal design of sports tournaments is an important topic of economics and operations
research. We have argued that organisers should not miss analysing incentive compatibility
because a sporting contest is supposed to be genuine, and is sold to the public as having
full integrity. While the actual probability of misaligned incentives can be relatively small,
and the audience does not necessarily recognise the problem, it is not worth risking a
potential scandal which has enormous financial and reputational costs.
Our simulation model suggests that the price of guaranteeing the incentive compatibility
of tournaments with multiple group stages is marginal, and the use of a fair mechanism
essentially does not affect the selective ability and the competitive balance of these
tournaments.
It is somewhat surprising that we have not found any controversy about the particular
handball match presented in Section 2. However, its detection is non-trivial as compared
to the football and basketball matches discussed in Section 1 because it was enough to
make some mistakes in defence or attack, without the need to score own goals. Reasonably,
the EHF remained silent on this issue, and the audience obviously did not study the
tie-breaking rules carefully. On the other hand, the Polish coach and players certainly knew
that they should not make great efforts to win by a higher margin. Hopefully, our paper
will contribute to placing this match in the category of the notorious “Nichtangriffspakt
(Schande) von Gijo´n”5 (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.1) in the history of sports.
Several directions remain open for future research. First, by the quantification of team
strengths and the modelling of match outcomes, the probability of misaligned incentives
can be estimated. Second, strategy-proofness can be considered as another aspect in
the comparison of different league formats (Goossens et al., 2012; Lasek and Gagolewski,
2018). Third, it is clear that there are various trade-offs between efficiency and fairness,
and sports administrators implicitly seem to accept some minimal level of tanking (Pauly,
2014). Thus the final aim may be an extensive axiomatic discussion and comparison of
sports ranking rules, which has started recently (Berker, 2014; Csato´, 2017; Vaziri et al.,
2018).
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Appendix
Figure A.1: The
tournament format which was used in the 2014 European Men’s Handball Championship
(a) Group stages: preliminary and main rounds
Group A
A1
A2
A3
A4
Group B
B1
B2
B3
B4
Group X
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
Group C
C1
C2
C3
C4
Group D
D1
D2
D3
D4
Group Y
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
(b) Knockout stage
F 𝒲/SF1𝒲/SF2
SF1 X1Y2
SF2 X2Y1
Semifinals Final
Third place
BM ℒ/SF1ℒ/SF2
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Figure A.2: Tournament format 𝐺66, which was used in the 2011 World Men’s
Handball Championship, and again in the 2019 World Men’s Handball Championship
(a) Group stages: preliminary and main rounds
Group A
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
Group B
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
Group X
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
Group C
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
Group D
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
Group Y
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
(b) Knockout stage
F 𝒲/SF1𝒲/SF2
SF1 X1Y2
SF2 X2Y1
Semifinals Final
Third place
BM ℒ/SF1ℒ/SF2
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Figure A.3:
Tournament format 𝐺46, which was used in the 2007 World Men’s Handball Championship
(a) Group stages: preliminary and main rounds
Group A
A1
A2
A3
A4
Group B
B1
B2
B3
B4
Group C
C1
C2
C3
C4
Group D
D1
D2
D3
D4
Group E
E1
E2
E3
E4
Group F
F1
F2
F3
F4
Group X
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
Group Y
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
(b) Knockout stage
F 𝒲/SF1𝒲/SF2
SF1 𝒲/QF1𝒲/QF2
QF1 X1Y4
QF2 X3Y2
SF2 𝒲/QF3𝒲/QF4
QF3 X2Y3
QF4 X4Y1
Quarterfinals Semifinals Final
Third place
BM ℒ/SF1ℒ/SF2
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